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Traditionally, the evolution of cooperation has been studied on single, isolated networks. Yet a player, espe-
cially in human societies, will typically be a member of many different networks, and those networks will play a
different role in the evolutionary process. Multilayer networks are therefore rapidly gaining on popularity as the
more apt description of a networked society. With this motivation, we here consider 2-layer scale-free networks
with all possible combinations of degree mixing, wherein one network layer is used for the accumulation of
payoffs and the other is used for strategy updating. We find that breaking the symmetry through assortative mix-
ing in one layer and/or disassortative mixing in the other layer, as well as preserving the symmetry by means of
assortative mixing in both layers, impedes the evolution of cooperation. We use degree-dependent distributions
of strategies and cluster-size analysis to explain these results, which highlight the importance of hubs and the
preservation of symmetry between multilayer networks for the successful resolution of social dilemmas.
PACS numbers: 87.23.Ge, 89.75.Fb, 89.75.Hc
I. INTRODUCTION
Evolutionary games on networks are the subject of intense
recent exploration, as evidenced by current reviews that fo-
cus both on pairwise social dilemmas, such as the prisoner’s
dilemma and the snowdrift game [1–3], as well as on games
that are governed by group interactions, such as the public
goods game [4]. The subject has been made popular by the
discovery that spatial structure can promote the evolution of
cooperation [5] through the mechanism that is now known as
network reciprocity [6]. In essence, network reciprocity relies
on the fact that cooperators do best if they are surrounded by
other cooperators. If interactions amongst players are struc-
tured rather than well-mixed, the clustering of cooperators is
more likely to be stable since defectors have limited oppor-
tunities for exploiting those that are located in the interior of
cooperative clusters. Further promoting the potency of net-
work reciprocity, which was initially studied predominantly
on regular lattices [7, 8], is heterogeneity of the interaction
networks. Especially the fact that scale-free networks pro-
vide a unifying framework for the evolution of cooperation
[9, 10] has captured the attention of the physics community, as
it became apparent that methods of statistical physics can be
used successfully to study collective phenomena in social sys-
tems [11], and in particular in evolutionary games [12]. Many
works have since been devoted to the study of evolutionary
games on small-world [13–19], scale-free [10, 20–33], coe-
volving [34–42], as well as hierarchical [43, 44] and bipartite
[45, 46] networks.
Although recent large-scale human experiments indicate
that spatial reciprocity may be compromised or fail altogether
[47, 48], there is still ample interest in understanding how and
why networks influence the evolution of cooperation. The at-
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tention has recently been shifting towards the evolution of co-
operation on interdependent and multilayer networks [49–56].
Indeed, several mechanisms have been discovered by means
of which the interdependence between different networks or
network layers may help to resolve social dilemmas. Ex-
amples include interdependent network reciprocity [53], non-
trivial organization of cooperators across the interdependent
layers [50], probabilistic interconnectedness [52], and infor-
mation transmission [56]. In addition to the evolution of co-
operation on interdependent and multilayer networks, cascad-
ing failures [57–60], competitive percolation [61–63], trans-
port [64], diffusion [65], neuronal synchronization [66], epi-
demic spreading [67], robustness against attack and assorta-
tivity [68, 69], stability [70], growth [71], entropy and overlap
[72], as well as abrupt transition in the structural formation
[73], have also been studied. Networks of networks have cap-
tivated the attention of large contingents of natural and so-
cial sciences [74–77], and a comprehensive review is already
available that survey the rapidly increasing literature [78].
Here we wish to extend the scope of evolutionary games on
multilayer networks by studying the impact of degree mixing
on 2-layer scale-free networks. One layer thereby serves as
the interaction network where players accumulate their pay-
offs, while the other layer serves as the updating network
where players change their strategies. This setup takes into
account the fact that especially in human societies each indi-
vidual is member in many different networks, and those net-
works typically play very different roles. The distinction of in-
teraction and updating networks is akin to previous works that
studied the impact of symmetry breaking between interaction
and replacement in evolutionary games on graphs [79, 80].
There it has been concluded that it is always harder for co-
operators to evolve whenever the two graphs do not coincide,
and our current results will support such a conclusion further.
In layered networks, for interdependent network reciprocity
to work [53], the simultaneous formation of correlated coop-
erative clusters on both networks is crucial, which however is
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FIG. 1: (Color online) Schematic presentation of a 2-layer system,
consisting of the interaction and the updating network. In the in-
teraction network players obtain their payoffs, while in the updating
network they look for neighbors to change their strategies. In the de-
picted example the two layers differ in their structure. We achieve
this by applying the Xulvi-Brunet-Sokolov algorithm [82] with dif-
ferent assortative/disassortative coefficient A (denoted by AI and
AU ) on each individual layer. If the applied value of A is the same
for both layers (AI = AU ), the symmetry between the interaction
and the updating network is preserved, and the setup becomes iden-
tical to a single scale-free network subject to degree mixing. We
use the “multilayer network” terminology to emphasize the impor-
tant conceptual link between this theoretical framework and previ-
ous works, where edge colored networks or “breaking the symmetry
between interaction and replacement” [79, 80] have also been used.
disturbed if the networks do not overlap or are insufficiently
interconnected [54]. In terms of degree mixing, we follow
the explorations by Rong et al. [21], who studied the role of
assortative and disassortative mixing on the evolution of coop-
eration on isolated scale-free networks. The study concluded
that assortative mixing by degree promotes defection because
of the increase of the interconnectedness of hubs, while disas-
sortative mixing may prevent the extinction of cooperators be-
cause isolated hubs act as a safe refuge against invading defec-
tors. As we will show when presenting the main results, our
study interpolates between the previous findings concerning
the symmetry breaking between interaction and replacement,
and the role of degree mixing on isolated scale-free networks.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. First,
we describe the mathematical model, in particular the pro-
cedure for the construction of multilayer scale-free networks
with assortative and disassortative mixing, as well as the def-
inition and the simulation protocol of social dilemmas. Next
we present the main results, whereas lastly we summarize and
discuss their implications.
II. MATHEMATICAL MODEL
The 2-layer scale-free networks are constructed as follows.
We first use the algorithm of Baraba´si and Albert [81] to con-
struct a neutrally degree-mixing scale-free network with an
average degree < k >= 4. Importantly, the algorithm may
introduce spurious correlations that violate neutral mixing if
the thermodynamic limit is not reached. To ensure a proper
0 1 2
-1
0
1
S
SD
PDSH
HG
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
 
T
FIG. 2: (Color online) Color map encoding the fraction of cooper-
ators ρC on the T − S parameter plane, as obtained on an isolated
scale-free network without degree mixing. Within our model this tra-
ditional setup is recovered for AI = AU = 0. In agreement with
known results (see [10]), the scale-free network is able to sustain co-
operation even for unfavorable combinations of T > 0 and S < 0.
We also delineate different quadrants, which represent different so-
cial dilemmas. The T < 1 and S > 1 quadrant marks the harmony
game (HG), which however does not constitute a social dilemma. For
the interpretation of color with regards to ρC see the vertical color bar
on the right. Due to the fine mesh, the interpolation of color (or lack
thereof) has no visible effect on the presentation of the results.
baseline setup without degree-mixing, we therefore use the
Xulvi-Brunet-Sokolov algorithm [82] to remove such correla-
tions. Alternatively, the configurational model by Molloy and
Reed [83] could also have been used to generate scale-free
networks without spurious correlations directly, thus allevi-
ating the need for further adjustments. Subsequently, again
using the Xulvi-Brunet-Sokolov algorithm [82], we produce
a series of degree-mixing networks, where A is the assorta-
tive/disassortative coefficient. Assortative mixing (i.e., A >
0) introduces the tendency for nodes with similar degree to
become directly connected, while disassortative mixing (i.e.,
A < 0) introduces the tendency for nodes with similar de-
gree to become disconnected. Since the coefficientA of most
empirical networks falls into the interval [−0.3, 0.3] [21], we
focus on this range when presenting the main results in Sec-
tion III. If both layers are characterized by the same value of
A, then they are completely identical.
Each player x is initially designated either as a cooperator
(strategy sx = C) or defector (strategy sx = D) with equal
probability, and it is simultaneously located on both networks.
One is the interaction network, where players play the evolu-
tionary game (to be introduced below) to obtain their payoffs,
while the other is the updating network, where players seek
for neighbors to potentially update their strategy. To take into
account the fact that the interaction and the updating network
may differ, we distinguish the values of A for both networks.
We useAI andAU to denote the assortive/disassortive coeffi-
cient of the interaction and the updating network, respectively.
3The setup of the 2-layer network where AI 6= AU is depicted
schematically in Fig. 1.
The evolutionary social dilemmas are defined as follows.
Mutual cooperation yields the reward R, mutual defection
leads to punishment P , and the mixed choice gives the co-
operator the sucker’s payoff S and the defector the tempta-
tion T . Within this traditional setup we have the prisoner’s
dilemma (PD) game if T > R > P > S, the snowdrift
game (SD) if T > R > S > P , and the stag-hunt (SH)
game if R > T > P > S, thus covering all three major social
dilemma types where players can choose between cooperation
and defection. Following common practice [1], we set R = 1
and P = 0, thus leaving the remaining two payoffs to occupy
−1 ≤ S ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ T ≤ 2, as depicted schematically in
Fig. 2.
We simulate the evolutionary process in accordance with
the standard Monte Carlo simulation procedure comprising
the following elementary steps. First, a randomly selected
player x acquires its payoff Px by playing the game with all
its neighbors on the interaction network. Next, player x ran-
domly chooses one neighbor y on the updating network, who
then also acquires its payoff Py on the interaction network in
the same way as previously player x. Lastly, player x adopts
the strategy sy from player y with a probability determined by
the Fermi function [8, 84]
W (sy → sx) =
1
1 + exp[(Px − Py)/K]
, (1)
where K = 0.1 quantifies the uncertainty related to the strat-
egy adoption process. The selected value of K is a traditional
and frequently employed choice that does not qualitatively af-
fect the evolutionary outcomes, as shown in many preceding
works and reviewed comprehensively in [1]. Each full Monte
Carlo step (MCS) gives a chance for every player to change
its strategy once on average. The baseline outcome is depicted
in Fig. 2, which is recovered if we set AI = AU = 0 when
constructing the 2-layer interaction network. For the presen-
tation of the results, we employ a color mapping of the frac-
tion of cooperators ρC on the T −S plane, as used recently in
[2, 85, 86], whereby the employed mesh encompasses 81×81
parameter combinations. In what follows, we will present
the main results for all possible combinations of AI and AU ,
first for the symmetry preserving AI = AU case, and subse-
quently for the symmetry breaking AI 6= AU case. The sim-
ulation results are typically obtained for scale-free networks
with 104 nodes, and the stationary fraction of cooperators ρC
is determined as the average within the last 104 out of the total
105 MCS. Naturally, close to the transition points to pure C
and D phases the system size needs to be increased to avoid
an accidental extinction of the subordinate strategy, and the
simulations times must be accordingly longer. We have taken
this into account by using larger system size where needed,
and the simulations were performed until the stationary state
was reached. In general, the equilibrium (or the stationary
state) is reached when the average of the cooperation level be-
comes time-independent. Moreover, since the structure of as-
sortative/disassortative networks and random distributions of
strategies may introduce additional uncertainty, the final re-
-1
0
1
 
 
S
0 1 2
-1
0
1
 
 
T
S
a  b
d
0 1 2
c
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
 
T
FIG. 3: (Color online) Color map encoding the fraction of coopera-
tors ρC on the T − S parameter plane, as obtained in the symmetry
preserving AI = AU case. Top two panel: assortative mixing is ap-
plied on both networks. Bottom two panels: disassortative mixing is
applied on both networks. Comparing with the baseline (see Fig. 2),
the evolution of cooperation is substantially inhibited. An exception
is strong disassortative mixing (panel d), where cooperators are able
to survive at slightly harsher conditions than for the baseline case.
From panel a to d, the values of the assortative/disassortative coeffi-
cient AI and AU are 0.1, 0.3, −0.1 and −0.3, respectively. For the
interpretation of color with regards to ρC see the horizontal color bar
at the bottom. Like in Fig. 2, the interpolation of color has no visible
effect on the presentation of the results.
sults are averaged over up to 100 independent runs for each
set of parameter values in order to assure suitable accuracy.
III. RESULTS
A. Symmetry preservation
To begin with, we present the results obtained for the sym-
metric degree mixing of both scale-free network layers. In this
case, the assortative/disassortative coefficient is thus identical
for both networks (AI = AU ), which returns our setup to
the already studied single degree-mixing network [21]. Fig-
ure 3 shows the color map encoding the fraction of cooper-
ation ρC on T − S parameter plane for four different values
of AI = AU . For the assortative mixing (top two panels),
it is clear that, compared with the baseline performance de-
picted in Fig. 2, cooperative behavior is restrained and the
dominance space of full cooperation shrinks. In particular,
the larger the value of AI (AU ), the more obvious the trait
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FIG. 4: (Color online) Color map encoding the fraction of coopera-
tors ρC on the T − S parameter plane, as obtained for the symmetry
breaking assortative mixing of the interaction network (AI > 0)
and the disassortative mixing of the updating network (AU < 0).
The presented results indicate that the evolution of cooperation is
impaired more severely if the mixing is stronger. Parameter values
are AI = 0.1, AU = −0.1 in panel a and AI = 0.2, AU = −0.2
in panel b, respectively. Interpretation and interpolation of color is
the same as in Fig. 3.
of inhibition. This is caused by the changes in the topology
that are due to assortative mixing. In particular, large-degree
hubs tend to interconnect with each other, which destroys the
sustainability of cooperative clusters and promotes the inva-
sion of defectors. If disassortative mixing is applied (bottom
two panels), we can see that, in the majority of the parame-
ter space, the level of cooperation is again lower than what
we have observed in the absence of mixing. However, under
harsh conditions, where the temptation to defect is large and
the sucker’s payoff is negative (the PD quadrant), we find that
cooperation is a slightly more persistent. Due to the absence
of direct links between large-degree hubs, the isolated coop-
erator nodes can successfully resist the invasion of defectors
and hold their initial strategy, even at conditions where the
neutrally mixing scale-network fails to sustain cooperative be-
havior. Along this line, if the disassortative mixing would be
even stronger, we can predict that this phenomenon may be-
come more noteworthy and extent across a larger are of the
T − S plane. These results are in agreement with [21], and
they provide an informed entry into the study of asymmetric
mixing (AI 6= AU ), which we consider next.
B. Symmetry breaking
In this section, we proceed with exploring the evolution of
cooperation under the different asymmetric degree mixing op-
tions of the interaction and the updating network layer. For
completeness, we consider all possible combinations of as-
sortative and disassortative mixing on both layers.
Results presented in Fig. 4 show the outcome obtained
when the interaction network is subject to assortative mixing
(AI > 0) while the updating layer is subject to disassortative
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FIG. 5: (Color online) Color map encoding the fraction of coopera-
tors ρC on the T − S parameter plane, as obtained for the symmetry
breaking disassortative mixing of the interaction network (AI < 0)
and the assortative mixing of the updating network (AU > 0). As in
the opposite case (Fig. 4), the evolution of cooperation is impaired
compared to the baseline, thus supporting the disruptive effect of
symmetry breaking. Parameter values are AI = −0.1, AU = 0.1
in panel a and AI = −0.2, AU = 0.2 in panel b, respectively.
Interpretation and interpolation of color is the same as in Fig. 3.
mixing (AU < 0). Compared to the baseline (see Fig. 2), this
combination fails to promote cooperation, and indeed in the
majority of the parameters space the evolution of cooperation
is inhibited, especially in the PD and SD quadrant. Even at
small temptations to defect the complete dominance of coop-
erators is no longer achievable, and as T increases further, co-
operative behavior fails faster than in the absence of mixing.
The threshold marking extinction of cooperators increases as
well. Although the assortative mixing of the interaction net-
work may bestow higher payoffs to cooperative hubs, this ad-
vantage fails to manifest because the updating network is dis-
assortative. Defectors, even if their degree is low, have access
to the hubs and can thus invade effectively.
Naturally, it is also of interest to investigate the evolution
of cooperation in the opposite case, namely if the interaction
layer is subject to disassortative mixing (AI < 0) while the
updating layer is subject to assortative mixing (AU > 0). We
present in Fig. 5 the results obtained for this particular mix-
ing combination, and we use the same absolute values for AI
and AU as in Fig. 4 for an easier direct comparison. The goal
is to test whether here the evolution of cooperation is also im-
paired. Compared with the results presented in Fig. 2, the con-
clusion is again that, although the coexistence of cooperators
and defectors is slightly extended on the T −S plane, the neg-
ative effect of symmetry breaking nullifies the advantage of
cooperative clusters and impairs the evolution of cooperation.
Here interconnected hubs might reinforce their cooperation in
the updating network, but the interaction network, where hubs
are disconnected, fails to support this with appropriately high
payoffs. Accordingly, we conclude that if assortative and dis-
assortative networks make up different layers of the complex
system, the multilayer combination does not promote the evo-
lution of cooperation, regardless of the type of combination.
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FIG. 6: (Color online) Color map encoding the fraction of coopera-
tors ρC on the T − S parameter plane, as obtained for the symmetry
breaking neutral mixing of the interaction network (AI = 0), the
assortative mixing of the updating network (AU > 0) (top two pan-
els), and the disassortative mixing of the updating network (AU < 0)
(bottom two panels). If only the updating network layer is subject to
degree mixing, the evolution of cooperation is impaired as well, and
this regardless of the type of mixing. Parameter values for panels a
to d areAU are 0.1, 0.3, −0.1 and−0.3, respectively. Interpretation
and interpolation of color is the same as in Fig. 3.
Aside from the two options considered in Figs. 4 and 5,
however, there are still further asymmetric setups that must
be explored. In particular, we have to consider the possibility
that only a single layer is subject to mixing, while the other re-
mains degree-neutral. With this option in mind, we first show
in Fig. 6 how cooperators fare if the interaction network re-
mains neutral (AI = 0), while the updating layer is subject
either to assortative mixing (top two panels) or disassortative
mixing (bottom two panels). For the assortative updating net-
work, it is clear that network reciprocity fails to protect co-
operators against the exploitation by defectors sooner than for
the baseline case. Both threshold values, marking the extinc-
tion of cooperators and defectors, increase with the increase
of the assortative coefficient. As evidenced in the upper right
panel, cooperators can only hold their undisputed dominance
within a limited region (focusing on the most demanding PD
and the SD quadrant) and go extinct even at moderate temp-
tations to defect, especially in the snowdrift quadrant. This
may be related to the preference for a checkerboard structure
(on regular lattices), where mixed strategies warrant the high-
est payoff in the snowdrift game. Interestingly, the situation
is even worse if the mixing of the updating layer is disassorta-
tive. Here (in the bottom two layers), not only does the overall
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FIG. 7: (Color online) Color map encoding the fraction of cooper-
ators ρC on the T − S parameter plane, as obtained for the sym-
metry breaking neutral mixing of the updating network (AU = 0),
the assortative mixing of the interaction network (AI > 0) (top
two panels), and the disassortative mixing of the interaction network
(AI < 0) (bottom two panels). As in Fig. 6, if only the interaction
network layer is subject to degree mixing, the evolution of coopera-
tion is also impaired. Parameter values for panels a to d are AI are
0.1, 0.3, −0.1 and −0.3, respectively. Interpretation and interpola-
tion of color is the same as in Fig. 3.
cooperation level decreases, but the dominance of coopera-
tors becomes impossible even for small temptations to defect
as well. These results indicate that, even if applied to a single
layer, degree mixing does not promote cooperation, especially
not if the symmetry between different layers is broken.
To conclude this section, we present results obtained with
the last outstanding option, which is that the updating net-
work remains neutrally mixing while the interaction network
is subject to either assortative or disassortative mixing. Fig-
ure 7 shows the results, which agree with those presented for
all the other options, and which thus further support the con-
clusion that degree mixing in multilayer networks impedes the
evolution of cooperation. As can be observed, and in agree-
ment with the trends outlined thus far, the larger the absolute
values of the coefficient AI , i.e., the stronger the mixing and
the larger the symmetry breaking between the interaction and
the updating network, the lesser the evolutionary success of
the cooperative behavior across the T − S plane. The failure
of cooperation in the presence of degree mixing on multilayer
networks can be understood and corroborated with an analy-
sis of the dynamical organization of cooperative clusters [20],
which we will attend to in the next section.
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FIG. 8: (Color online) Distributions of cooperators ρC−k in depen-
dence on the node degree k on multilayer networks subject to differ-
ent degree-mixing combinations. In both panels, red squares denote
the distribution of cooperators for the baseline (i.e.,AI = AU = 0).
It can be seen that cooperators occupy the hub nodes, which in turn
attract a great number of followers to form giant cooperative clusters.
Panel a shows the distribution for the symmetric case, where the val-
ues of assortative/disassortative coefficients are AI = AU = −0.3
(blue stars) and AI = AU = 0.3 (green triangles). Panel b dis-
plays the distribution for a typical asymmetric case, where the values
of assortative/disassortative coefficient are AI = −0.2, AU = 0.2
(blue stars) and AI = 0.2, AU = −0.2 (green triangles). Irrespec-
tive of whether the symmetry is preserved or broken, degree mixing
in the studied multilayer networks decreases the ability of coopera-
tors to hold onto the hubs of the network. All the potential followers
therefore become more susceptible to defector invasions, and con-
sequently the overall density of cooperators decreases. Presented
results were obtained for T = 1.9 and S = 0.5, but remain qual-
itatively the same also for other T − S combinations. The error bars
in all panels are comparable to two times the symbol size.
C. Analysis of cooperator clusters
Although the simulation results yield a conclusive formula-
tion of the impact of degree mixing on the evolution of coop-
eration in multilayer networks, one may still be curious as to
why that is the case. While we have outlined some heuristic
arguments when presenting the results, a more quantitative in-
sight can be obtained by studying degree-dependent distribu-
tions of strategies and performing a cluster-size analysis. Fig-
ure 8 features the distribution of cooperators in dependence on
the degree of nodes for different combinations of mixing. For
the baseline case (neutral mixing with symmetry breaking),
we recover well-known results [9, 20], according to which co-
operators generally occupy the hubs of the network (although
cooperation is possible in the presence of defector hubs too
[29]). Results in Fig. 9 further complement this picture by
demonstrating that cooperators form a giant cooperative clus-
ter and thereby make the most out of network reciprocity [5].
Degree mixing, however, distorts this setup. Clusters disin-
tegrate, and they become smaller. Cooperators are no longer
able to hold onto the hubs, and the defectors have an easier
time invading the smaller and more vulnerable cooperative
domains. The stronger the mixing and the stronger the sym-
metry breaking between the interaction and updating network,
the more complete and dramatic the disintegration becomes.
The organizational efficiency of cooperators decays signifi-
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FIG. 9: (Color online) Number of cooperative clusters NC (panels
a and b) and the size of the largest cooperative cluster SC (panels c
and d), as obtained for different degree-mixing combinations. Panels
a and c show the results for symmetric mixing, where the middle col-
umn (green dotted fill) corresponds to AI = AU = −0.3 (disassor-
tative mixing), while the right column (blue dashed fill) corresponds
toAI = AU = 0.3 (assortative mixing). Panels b and d show the re-
sults for asymmetric mixing, where the middle column (green dotted
fill) corresponds to AI = 0.2, AU = −0.2, while the right column
(blue dashed fill) corresponds to AI = −0.2, AU = 0.2. In all pan-
els, the left column (red solid fill) depicts the result for the baseline
case (AI = AU = 0), where the small values of NC indicate that
cooperators form giant clusters (typically there are only one or two
clusters per network) to protect themselves against the invasion of
defectors. When mixing is introduced, however, it can be observed
that the cooperative clusters become more common and smaller com-
pared to the baseline case. If in addition to mixing also the symmetry
between the interaction and updating layers is broken, the disintegra-
tion of the large cooperative cluster on many small cooperative clus-
ters is even more dramatic (note the log scale vertically). Presented
results were obtained for T = 1.9 and S = 0.5, but remain qualita-
tively the same also for other T −S combinations. The error bars on
the columns are too small for visual display.
cantly, and it is interesting to discover that none of the pos-
sible combinations of mixing in multilayer networks (except
for the symmetry-preserving disassortative mixing under ad-
verse conditions) is able to improve the baseline support that
is awarded to cooperators on isolated neutrally mixing scale-
free networks.
IV. DISCUSSION
We have studied the evolution of cooperation on multilayer
scale-free networks subject to assortative and disassortative
mixing. We have considered all three main social dilemma
types, and all possible combinations of assortativity and dis-
assortativity. We have shown that, only if the symmetry be-
7tween the interaction and the updating network is preserved,
does the isolation of the hubs that is due to disassortative mix-
ing sustain cooperation at harsher conditions than an isolated
neutrally mixing scale-free network. If the symmetry between
the interaction and the updating network is preserved but the
mixing is assortative, the evolution of cooperation is impaired
because the increasing interconnectedness of hubs favors the
invasion of defectors. These results agree with the preced-
ing work performed on an isolated scale-free network that
is subject to degree mixing [21]. On the other hand, if the
symmetry between the interaction and the updating network
is broken, then any combination of assortative and disassor-
tative mixing, regardless to which layer it applies to, impairs
the evolution of cooperation. This conclusion applies to all so-
cial dilemmas, although most affected by degree mixing and
the symmetry breaking are the snowdrift and the prisoner’s
dilemma quadrant. These results, on the other hand, agree
with the exploration of symmetry breaking between interac-
tion and replacement, as studied by Ohtsuki et al. [79]. The
degree-dependent distributions of strategies reveal that degree
mixing on multilayer networks hinders the ability of cooper-
ators to persistently occupy the hubs, which in turn impairs
their ability to make use of the enhanced network reciprocity
that could be warranted by the degree heterogeneity of the
interaction and the updating network [9]. This conclusion is
strengthened and quantitatively corroborated by the investiga-
tion of the number and the size of cooperative clusters. The
latter become more common and smaller as soon as the two
layers loose symmetry, and regardless of how the symmetry
breaking is introduced, i.e., whether the interaction network is
subject to assortative mixing and the updating layer is subject
to disassortative mixing, or vice versa, or if only a single net-
work layer is subject to either type of mixing while the other
layer remains degree neutral. These results thus interpolate
between the impact of degree mixing on isolated networks,
and the impact of symmetry breaking between interaction and
replacement, and by doing so they provide further insight that
fosters our understanding of the evolution of cooperation on
multilayer networks. A specific point that merits further re-
search is the consideration of different time scales related to
the interaction and replacement, as already noted in [79] and
studied prominently in [87]. Along with related recent dis-
coveries [49–56], as well as many other phenomena that are
currently investigated in the realm of multilayer networks in
statistical physics [78], we hope that our study will help con-
tribute to the continued vibrancy of this field of research.
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